How Can American Elections Resist Interference?

TL;DR

Election resilience depends on securing computer assets, auditing results, educating voters, and directing the public to trusted local election officials. Because routine irregularities, high turnout, and administrative problems can be misrepresented as attacks, officials must explain election procedures in advance, coordinate across federal, state, and local levels, and quickly counter false claims that could undermine confidence.

Transcript

So good afternoon and, uh, welcome to the session Enemies at the Gate: Protecting American Democracy in 2020. This session is a panel, so let me introduce you the moderator, Thresa Payton, CEO and president at Borderless Solutions. Please, the stage is yours. Thank you. Hello, everybody. Good to see you. So, um, you have the bios of, um, my esteeme... Read More

Key Insights

• Election administration is a complicated responsibility that requires security, information technology, adult education, training, and project-management capabilities, often from officials who also hold other duties and work with limited time, personnel, money, skills, knowledge, and operational capacity.
• Ordinary election irregularities are unavoidable, particularly when high turnout places additional stress on administrative systems. Bad actors can amplify small problems arising during normal operations and portray them as evidence of a compromised outcome, creating distrust among voters, candidates, and campaigns.
• State election officials can directly influence the protection of cybersecurity assets and computer systems. They can select personnel, devices, and supporting resources, but their ability to strengthen operations remains subject to fiscal limitations and the unexpected failures associated with sophisticated, network-connected systems.
• Foreign influence operations are difficult for election officials to control because they shape public opinion and confidence outside the systems administrators manage. The operations observed around 2016 were described as continuing both before and after that election, requiring officials to consider how they can improve public resilience.
• Adversaries can undermine trust without accessing an election system. They can observe long lines, data-transfer difficulties, or administrative mistakes and falsely claim involvement, leaving officials with the difficult task of disproving an allegation while protecting confidence in the institution.
• Pre-bunking is an advance defense against election misinformation. It involves educating voters before incidents occur, explaining expected procedures and problems, strengthening voter resilience, identifying reliable sources, and reducing the opportunity for malicious actors to exploit uncertainty surrounding an election.
• The federal response divides misinformation into supply and demand problems. The FBI, supported by the intelligence community, addresses foreign sources and attempts to prevent them from seeding disinformation, while CISA focuses on education, trusted voices, accurate voting information, and shortening false information's life cycle.
• Public participation improves understanding of election safeguards. Serving as a poll worker, attending required logic and accuracy tests, touring a local election office, and asking officials questions can help voters recognize legitimate procedures and correct misleading claims encountered through articles, social media, or personal conversations.

Questions & Answers

Q: How can election officials protect public trust?

Election officials can protect public trust by securing the computer assets they directly control, explaining election procedures before problems arise, and directing voters to reliable local sources. They should also prepare the public for routine irregularities, long lines, data-transfer issues, and other administrative difficulties so malicious claims cannot easily transform ordinary events into supposed evidence of interference.

Q: Why can minor election problems become major threats?

Minor problems can become major threats when bad actors amplify them to create doubt about an election's outcome. Elections are complicated, resources are limited, and high turnout can strain operations, so flawless administration is unrealistic. An adversary can observe a delay, irregularity, or technical issue and claim responsibility without ever accessing an election system, thereby weakening public confidence.

Q: What election security factors can states control?

State election officials can influence the security applied to cybersecurity assets, computer systems, personnel, devices, and supporting resources. They can bring skilled people and protective measures to bear on sophisticated systems with network connections and critical dependencies. Their choices are nevertheless constrained by available funding, and unexpected events can still affect systems even when administrators prepare carefully.

Q: How do foreign influence operations threaten elections?

Foreign influence operations threaten elections by shaping public opinion and confidence, including through false claims about administrative or technical problems. Election officials cannot directly control these campaigns in the same way they control computer assets. The panel describes such operations as occurring before 2016, becoming highly visible in 2016, and continuing afterward, which makes public resilience an ongoing priority.

Q: What is pre-bunking in election security?

Pre-bunking is the practice of countering likely misinformation before a cyberattack, false allegation, or administrative problem occurs. Election officials educate voters about normal procedures, expected irregularities, reliable sources, and accurate details concerning when, where, and how voting occurs. This preparation makes it harder for adversaries to exploit confusion and helps voters evaluate dramatic claims more carefully.

Q: How do federal agencies counter election disinformation?

Federal agencies divide the challenge into the supply and demand for false information. The FBI, with support from the intelligence community, targets foreign actors and tries to prevent them from seeding disinformation. CISA focuses on reducing the American demand for misleading claims through education, trusted community voices, accurate election information, and efforts to shorten the period during which false narratives circulate.

Q: How can voters learn whether election claims are credible?

Voters can learn how elections work by serving as poll workers, attending federally required logic and accuracy tests, visiting local election offices, requesting tours, and asking officials questions. Direct experience with voting methods, protocols, and safeguards prepares people to identify misleading articles or social-media posts and to correct inaccurate claims during conversations with others.

Q: Why are trusted local voices important during elections?

Trusted local voices are important because they can provide accurate information about election times, places, methods, procedures, and administrative events. Community sources and election officials can amplify verified guidance while pushing down malicious claims. When voters know where to seek authoritative explanations, misinformation has less opportunity to exploit uncertainty, routine mistakes, or differences among locally administered election processes.

Summary & Key Takeaways

• Election officials operate complicated systems with limited time, personnel, funding, and specialized expertise. Perfect administration is unrealistic, especially under record turnout and increased scrutiny. The central concern is that bad actors may amplify ordinary irregularities, delays, long lines, or data-transfer problems to create distrust among voters, candidates, and political campaigns.

• State officials can directly strengthen cybersecurity assets, personnel, devices, and operational resources, although fiscal constraints limit their choices. Foreign influence operations present a different challenge because election administrators cannot directly control them. Adversaries may never access a system, yet still claim responsibility for visible problems and thereby damage confidence in election institutions.

• Federal agencies divide their response between disrupting foreign sources of disinformation and reducing the public demand that allows false claims to spread. Local resilience begins with voter education, trusted community voices, poll-worker participation, public logic and accuracy testing, election-office engagement, audits, and advance explanations of normal procedures and possible administrative difficulties.