When the Public Sphere Loses Its Right to Laugh

Keith Markovich

Hatched by Keith Markovich

Jul 08, 2026

11 min read

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What happens when everyone speaks the language of legitimacy, but nobody trusts the speaker?

There is a strange kind of collapse that can happen in a society long before institutions visibly fail. The newspapers still publish. The experts still appear on television. The slogans still arrive polished and confident, carrying the reassuring perfume of competence. And yet something essential has died: the public no longer believes that the people speaking to it are separated from power by any meaningful distance.

That is the hidden crisis. Not simply that information is wrong, biased, or incomplete, but that the entire system of public truth begins to look like a closed fraternity. The same circles, the same pedigrees, the same money, the same assumptions, the same social rooms. In that world, journalism stops feeling like a watchdog and starts feeling like a house organ with better lighting.

Then a counter-image appears: a Jewish president of Ukraine, embraced not despite his Jewishness but, in a profound historical reversal, as the nation itself. Suddenly identity is not a sign of exclusion from legitimacy. It becomes proof that legitimacy can be reinvented. The deeper question linking these two realities is unsettling and important: what makes a public believe that a person speaks for the whole, rather than for the class or tribe that produced them?

The answer is not simply facts. It is not even merely character. It is something older and more fragile: symbolic separation.


The real problem is not propaganda. It is incestuous credibility.

Most discussions of media decay focus on misinformation, speed, polarization, or platform incentives. Those are real, but they miss the emotional core of the problem. People do not merely object to falsehood. They object to the sense that the falsehood is being produced by a club whose members share homes, schools, therapists, donors, and dinner parties with the people they are supposed to scrutinize.

That is why institutional trust has become so brittle. When the audience sees ex intelligence officials on cable news, wealthy editors moving among power brokers, and “neutral” experts whose careers depend on the same elite networks they describe, the issue is not just conflict of interest. It is symbolic contamination. The messenger no longer appears to stand outside the system. He appears to be decorated by it.

This is why so much of modern news feels less like reporting and more like a ritual of class self-recognition. The content may be technically informative, but the deeper function is to reassure the informed that their worldview remains the authorized worldview. The public senses this. Not always consciously, but viscerally. It hears the same vocabulary, the same alarm tones, the same appeals to democracy, science, responsibility, and expertise, and increasingly asks: responsibility to whom, expertise for whom, and democracy under whose management?

A public does not need perfect objectivity. It needs to believe that the people shaping the narrative are not spiritually employed by the same class they claim to oversee.

Once that belief is gone, every bulletin becomes suspect. Not because the audience has become irrational, but because it has become pattern literate.


Zelensky’s power came from a reversal the modern elite cannot easily explain

The remarkable thing about a Jewish Ukrainian president becoming a national symbol is not merely that he won office. Democracies elect minorities and outsiders all the time. The deeper shock is that his identity did not prevent him from becoming the embodiment of the nation in a moment of existential danger. In historical terms, that should not be a minor detail. It is a massive civilizational reversal.

For much of European history, Jewishness was used as a marker of alienation from the nation, a way of saying, explicitly or implicitly, that a Jew could be clever, competent, even indispensable, but never fully representative of the body politic. The ancient script said: useful, maybe. Central, no.

Zelensky breaks that script. He demonstrates a form of political legitimacy that is not based on purity, pedigree, or inherited cultural comfort. It is based on shared fate. He becomes credible not because he resembles the old ruling template, but because he visibly bears the nation’s risk with everyone else.

That is the part modern elites often miss when they talk about inclusion in abstract moral language. They assume legitimacy is a matter of representation by category. But the public often grants legitimacy by something more concrete: who is exposed to the same danger, and who is willing to be seen in the same light as everyone else? Zelensky’s significance is not just that he is Jewish. It is that he is legible as a national figure without needing to erase the difference that history once made fatal.

This matters because it offers a contrasting model to the mediating class that dominates so much contemporary discourse. The informing class often asks the public to trust it because it is enlightened, credentialed, and responsible. Zelensky asks the public to trust him because he is present, vulnerable, and bound to the same fate. One legitimacy is managerial. The other is existential.

Those are not the same thing.


News has become a machine for producing legitimacy without intimacy

Modern information systems have a particular weakness: they can generate endless authority signals without generating trust. A headline can cite sources, a panel can assemble experts, a feed can simulate omniscience, and none of it will matter if the audience feels no human or civic intimacy with the people behind it.

This is where the problem becomes deeper than bias. The public does not merely distrust individual claims. It distrusts the social architecture of claim making. When people suspect that information is curated by a narrow class whose survival depends on managing perception rather than clarifying reality, then even accurate reporting starts to feel like manipulation in a clean shirt.

The result is a paradox. The more institutions try to reinforce their credibility through expert branding, moral seriousness, and insider access, the more they can look like they are speaking in a dialect unavailable to ordinary life. They become fluent in systems, metrics, and abstractions, but tone deaf to the public’s lived experience of being managed, lectured, and occasionally sacrificed.

This is why public debate now so often degenerates into mutual accusation. If there is no widely trusted referee, argument stops being a search for truth and becomes a contest of affiliation. People do not ask, “What is true?” first. They ask, “Whose side is this serving?” In that environment, every claim is treated as a loyalty test.

The tragedy is that once discourse enters this mode, even well-intentioned actors begin to speak like propagandists because they are forced to perform certainty in order to survive. The system thereby manufactures the very cynicism it condemns.


The deepest political divide is between those who share risk and those who curate it

Here is a useful framework: every public figure, institution, or narrative can be evaluated by the relationship between speech and risk.

  1. Shared risk: the speaker is visibly exposed to the same stakes as the people he addresses.
  2. Curated risk: the speaker describes danger while remaining buffered from it.
  3. Transferred risk: the speaker’s decisions increase risk for others while reducing it for the speaker’s own class.

This framework explains why some figures inspire loyalty even across divides while others with impeccable credentials inspire only shrugging contempt. People are not stupid. They recognize when a person’s rhetoric is attached to consequences that the speaker must also bear.

Zelensky’s symbolic force comes from shared risk. He cannot be understood merely as a media personality turned politician, or as a postmodern celebrity in wartime. He is a man whose public identity is inseparable from exposure. The camera sees not just his message, but his stakes.

By contrast, much of institutional discourse in wealthy democracies feels like curated risk. Officials and commentators speak with urgency about crisis, inequality, extremism, climate, disinformation, democracy itself, but the audience senses that the speakers will not suffer proportionally if their prescriptions fail. They may lose status. They may face criticism. But they do not face the ordinary hazards imposed on everyone else.

That gap matters more than ideology. People can forgive disagreement. They are far less forgiving of asymmetry.

The public will tolerate being led by people who are wrong. It will not tolerate being managed by people who are insulated from the consequences of being wrong.

That is why trust dies when institutions become too cozy with the powerful they are meant to observe. It is not a minor optics problem. It is a metaphysical one. The public is asking: do you inhabit my reality, or do you merely describe it from a protected altitude?


Why the bullshit feels so persuasive anyway

One reason the information environment remains powerful is that it does not only lie. It also flatters. It offers the pleasure of righteous vigilance, the thrill of being informed, the sense that you are watching the hidden gears of the world turn. You can scroll, denounce, decode, and feel morally awake while never leaving the architecture of the machine.

That is the addictive part. The bullshit is not just content. It is a mood and a posture. It transforms suspicion into identity. It offers you the feeling of insight without the burden of rebuilding any common ground.

But this is also why the bullshit is exhausting. It trains the mind to see every claim as a performance, every institution as a mask, every public gesture as a form of managed theater. Eventually you become able to detect manipulation everywhere, but unable to recognize sincerity when it appears.

At that point, even authentic symbols of shared fate can be misread. A leader who truly belongs to the people can be mistaken for a brand. A public act of courage can be reduced to messaging. A hard-won expression of national unity can be dismissed as narrative engineering. Cynicism becomes self-sealing.

And yet the alternative is not naïve trust. The alternative is a more demanding standard: not, “Is this statement polished?” but, “What kind of relationship to risk does this statement reveal?” That question cuts through a lot of fog.


What a healthier public sphere would have to recover

A functioning public sphere cannot be restored by fact-checking alone. It needs credible separation. That means institutions must not only tell the truth when they can, but visibly stop belonging to the same private world as the people whose conduct they are supposed to scrutinize.

This is harder than it sounds. It may require more than new ethics rules or better editorial phrasing. It may require visible refusal of elite capture, stronger boundaries around revolving doors, fewer expert panels that function like status pageants, and more voices whose authority comes from lived exposure rather than institutional choreography.

It also requires a new respect for forms of legitimacy that contemporary elites often dismiss as sentimental or primitive. Shared sacrifice, local knowledge, plain speech, and visible accountability are not leftovers from a less sophisticated age. They are the infrastructure of trust.

Zelensky’s significance, in this light, is not only political but epistemic. He reminds us that people still know the difference between an authority figure and a fellow risk-bearer. They still respond to the person who appears inside the danger rather than above it. That lesson matters far beyond war.

It applies to journalism, public health, education, corporate messaging, and democratic leadership. Any institution that wants trust must answer a basic question: where do you stand relative to the burden you are asking others to carry?


Key Takeaways

  1. Trust is not built by competence alone. It is built when people believe the speaker is separated from power enough to tell the truth about it.
  2. The public is highly sensitive to class incest. When journalists, officials, and experts seem socially fused with the powerful, their credibility collapses, even if some claims are accurate.
  3. Shared risk creates legitimacy. People trust leaders and institutions more when they visibly bear the same dangers and consequences as everyone else.
  4. Cynicism is not the opposite of propaganda. It is often the product of repeated contact with managed narratives that feel technically informative but socially dishonest.
  5. Repair requires boundaries, not just better messaging. A healthier information order needs visible distance from power, not merely polished explanations of power.

The nation, the newsroom, and the meaning of belonging

The most interesting connection between media decay and Zelensky’s symbolic rise is this: both reveal that belonging is not a matter of declaration, but of recognition under stress.

A news institution belongs to the public only if the public feels it is answerable to realities beyond its own social circle. A leader belongs to the nation only if the nation can see itself, under pressure, reflected in that leader’s fate. In both cases, legitimacy is born when speech is welded to exposure.

That is why the modern information order feels so unstable. It tries to produce authority without sacrifice, unity without exposure, and truth without credible distance from power. But people can sense the absence. They know when they are being managed by a class that speaks in the language of concern while living in a different moral climate.

The good news, if there is one, is that legitimacy can still be reinvented. It does not have to come from inherited pedigree, ethnic purity, or institutional theater. It can come from visible commitment, from bearing risk, from saying, in effect: I am not outside the story I am telling you.

That may be the most important test of public life now. Not whether a speaker is fluent, credentialed, or on message, but whether the speaker is willing to stand where consequences fall.

Because in the end, people do not only ask whether the story is true. They ask whether the storyteller belongs to the same reality as they do. When that answer becomes yes, the public can still be rebuilt. When it becomes no, even perfect information will sound like bullshit.

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