Hoover created a group on the platform, invited some startup friends, and asked them to contribute by sharing links to their favorite products.

Product Hunt was an early example ofstarting with a community and then building the product, rather than the other way around.

By the time Product Hunt graduated from the accelerator, it had attracted tens of thousands of visitors, growing 75% month-over-month.

Hoover found a kindred spirit in Ravikant, someone who had devoted his life to helping new ventures get their start. That resonated with Hoover's mission. Shortly after that meeting, Ravikant asked to invest.

More than winning new users, Product Hunt won affection, building a genuine, warm community very different than the snark and sarcasm of Hacker News or Reddit. Much of that was down to Hoover himself, by all accounts a genuinely kind, charismatic leader.

Ryan is the best community and product person I've ever met. No one could have built Product Hunt as he did. He's a master of community, partially because he's so genuinely likable. And he's likable at scale.

There was only one problem: Product Hunt wasn't making money. That had been a strategic choice, with Hoover prioritizing the platform's growth, a playbook pioneered by other consumer hits. Today, Hoover remarks that "in hindsight, I would have dedicated 10% of our resources toward [generating revenue]."

In pursuit of revenue, Product Hunt launched a "Shop" in partnership with General Electric. The company also explored other verticals, integrating podcasts and book reviews. It didn't move the needle.

By late 2016, Hoover had two choices: a Series B on unfavorable terms or a new alliance with AngelList.

Ship changed that by offering pre-launch audience-building tools. This represented Product Hunt's first attempt at generating subscription revenue and remains part of the platform today.

Hoover notes that Live Chat was "This was VERY effective in building the brand in the early days" but didn't make a meaningful difference at scale.

Hoover had been thinking of leaving for a while. After seven years spent building one of the internet's liveliest communities, he felt it was time to turn the page.

It is now almost unthinkable for a new product to launch without posting on the platform. It represents an opportunity to win new users and attention at no added cost, often resulting in meaningful valuation changes.

Product Hunt makes the majority of its revenue through advertisements. The company sells five sponsorship products: promoted listings, email collection, topic-based ads, newsletter sponsorship, and job postings.

According to Hoover, Product Hunt forecasts $3.3 million in revenue this year, with $2.9 million coming from advertising. The remaining $400K in revenue comes from Ship and Founder Club subscriptions (more below). Hoover notes that the company was nearly profitable in 2020.

Product Hunt should clear room for new growth by shuttering or transforming the site's least used corners. 

Because of the platform's focus on individual launches, the relationship that forms between consumer and maker is time-bound.

Leveraging early traction data (number of email sign-ups, for example), Product Hunt could bring Early into this flow, giving an extra distribution bump to promising projects.

Founders often need help before they have an idea, let alone a product to work on. To front-run the existing maker flow, Product Hunt should establish an incubator.

Though its arguably never been easier to launch a startup, it’s never been harder to gain attention.

In the past, companies launched products to gain attention, to win customers, to attract investment. With a crowdfunding model, all three of those needs (attention, customers, and investment) could happen at once.