12237052.pdf
core.ac.uk
intellect knowledge of the first group of mental states. phenomenal mental states (sensations: bodily feelings and perceptual experiences, for example hearing a sound or feeling hot), Aquinas puts it, 'It is clear that our mind cannot be directly aware of the individual. We are aware of the individu
1 Users
0 Comments
6 Highlights
0 Notes
Top Highlights
- intellect knowledge of the first group of mental states.
- phenomenal mental states (sensations: bodily feelings and perceptual experiences, for example hearing a sound or feeling hot),
- Aquinas puts it, 'It is clear that our mind cannot be directly aware of the individual. We are aware of the individual directly through our sense-powers.' (DV, 10, 5)
- Further problems
- with self-knowledge of our intentional mental states turn on the fact that, for Aquinas, only thoughts that are somehow based on sense images would be about a particular thing and thus the intellect could not know them by itself.
Domain
Ready to highlight and find good content?
Glasp is a social web highlighter that people can highlight and organize quotes and thoughts from the web, and access other like-minded people’s learning.